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NOTES & COMMENTS
The Road Not Taken: Able v. United States, Equal
Protection, Due Deference, and Rational Basis Review

INTRODUCTION

In Able v. United States, the Second Circuit missed an
opportunity to clarify the current state of rational basis review as
applied to Equal Protection challenges.' The Court relied on the
principle of due deference to the Military and as a consequence, failed
to clarify when and where it is appropriate to apply the rational basis
review used in cases such as City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Romer v. Evans, and Palmore v. Sidoti.2 More importantly, it
also failed to grant our gay service persons their Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection of the law.
Lieutenant Colonel Jane Able, 3 Petty Officer Robert Heigl,
First Lieutenant Kenneth Osborn, Sergeant Steven Spencer,
Lieutenant Richard von Wohld and Seaman Werner Zehr, six gay
service persons who had served honorably in the Military for many
years, challenged the controversial "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
(the "Act" or the "Policy"). 4 The plaintiffs argued that the new statute
1 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
See infra notes 113-207 and accompanying text.

2

3 "Jane Able" is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserve; the name is
a
pseudonym. See Able v. United States, 88 F. 3d 1280, at 1284, n.1 (2d Cir. 1996).
4See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). The Act states: "Policy. A member of the armed
forces shall be separated from the armed forces under regulations.. . if one or more of the
following findings is made ... 1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage
in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act .... unless. . . that the member has
demonstrated that - a) such conduct is a departure from member's usual ... behavior; b)
such conduct ... is unlikely to recur; c) such conduct was not accomplished by use of
force ... ; d) ... the member's continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with
the interests of the armed forces ... e) the member does not have a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts. 2) That the member has stated he or she is a homosexual ...
unless ... the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in,
attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual
acts. 3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the
same biological sex." 10 U.S.C. § 654(b).
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violated both their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment and their right to free speech under the First
5
Amendment.
Initially, the plaintiffs sought and obtained an injunction that
prevented the Military from initiating discharge proceedings against
them.6 The Second Circuit upheld this injunction. On March 30,
1995, the District Court held that Section (b)(2) of the Act violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, but that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to contest section (b)(1). 8 On appeal, the Second Circuit
vacated and remanded that decision, instructing the District Court to
rule on the constitutionality of section (b)(1) and to hold further
proceedings with respect to section (b)(2). 9 The District Court
subsequently held the entire Act unconstitutional.10 The Second
Circuit in turn overruled this decision."
This Comment explores the equal protection challenge in
Able. As groundwork to the discussion of Able, Part One reviews the
history of Equal Protection.12 Because so much of Equal Protection
analysis hinges on the levels of scrutiny, Part One also provides a
brief review of those levels and their application; particularly as
5 See Able v. United States 847 F. Supp. 1038, 1039 (E.D.N.Y.
1994).
6
1d. at 1045-46.
7 See Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128, 133 (2d
Cir. 1995).
8 See Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 980
(E.D. N.Y. 1995). The
District Court declined plaintiffs argument with respect to § 654(b)(1) of the Act for lack
of standing. Id.at 970. Section (b)(1) states that a member will be separated from the
Military if the member has "engaged, attempted to engage, or solicited another to engage,
in homosexual acts ....10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1). "The six plaintiffs have 'stated' in their
complaint that they are 'homosexuals.' That is the only thing that they have done that is
before the court. Under the state of the pleadings the court thus does not consider the case
to draw into question the validity of any subsection of the Act other than (b)(2)." Able,
880 F. Supp. at 972. Section (b)(2) states that a member will "be separated ... if one or
more of the following findings is made ...[t]hat the member has stated that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect .... 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2).
9 See Able v. United States, 88 F. 3d 1280, 1300 (2d Cir.
1996).
10 968 F. Supp. 850, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
11 155 F. 3d 628, 636 (2d Cir. 1998).
12 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No state shall ...

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
accompanying text.

deny to any person within

See also infra notes 19-38 and

1999]

ABLE v. UNITED STATES

409

applied to the Military. 3 Part Two discusses Able, focusing on a
comparison of the Second Circuit' 4 and Eastern District of New
York' 5 decisions, as well as discussing three relevant Equal Protection
decisions: Romer v. Evans, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, and Palmore v. Sidoti. 6 Part Three contains a brief
discussion of homosexuals as a suspect class.' 7 This comment
concludes that although the class should indeed be expanded, Romer
v. Evans, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, and Palmore v.
Sidoti clearly speak to the principle that even with the most minimum
level of judicial scrutiny, the Act does not pass constitutional muster.
Instead, even giving due deference to the Military, the Act only serves
to further an illegitimate purpose.18 Additionally, the Second Circuit
missed an opportunity to clarify the legitimate purpose prong of
rational basis review.
I. HISTORY AND TRADITION

A. Equal Protection
Granting equal protection of the law to our gay service
persons is consistent with both our current and historical
understanding of the meaning of "equal protection of the laws."
Although today, equal protection of the laws means that the law will
treat in an equal manner those who are similarly situated, 9 there are
conflicting views as to whether this was the original purpose of the

13See infra notes 39-79 and accompanying text.
14See Able, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
15Able, 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
16 See infra notes 119-65 and accompanying text.
17 Infra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432
(1985) (holding a zoning ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it had
no legitimate purpose); see also infra notes 166-207 and accompdnying text.
19 See id. at 439.
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Equal Protection Clause.2 ° Some argue that the drafters of the Clause
primarily intended to bolster existing Constitutional guarantees that
were not being enforced by the States. 21 Others claim the Clause's
primary impetus was racial, while others believe that the Clause was
intended to deal with a broad panoply of discrimination. 22 Support
can be found for all these positions in both the broad language of the
Clause and in the legislative history.23 Ultimately, the Clause is a
product of prevailing social theories, and "[t]he right to protection
[that] has deep roots in the English legal tradition." 24 "Although
mainstream theories of the intent of the drafters of the Equal
Protection Clause differ widely, all share one distinctive
characteristic[, they all

...

r]ead[] the Clause as guaranteeing the

protection of equal laws ....
"No state shall ...

deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.",26 The Fourteenth Amendment was
passed as part of the sweeping Reconstruction Amendments in the era
immediately following the Civil War.2 7 It was intended as a "unifying
force" 28 that would be the cornerstone of the Reconstruction
Program. 29 The Equal Protection Clause incorporated the prevailing
20 E.g., Steven J. Heyman, The FirstDuty of Government: Protection, Liberty,
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L. J. 507 (1991). "The principal aim of the
Fourteenth Amendment was not to create new rights, but rather to incorporate into the
Federal Constitution the fundamental rights that individuals already possessed under
general constitutional theory, but that the states had failed to enforce adequately." Id. at
509. See also Earl A. Maltz, The Concept ofEqual Protection of the Laws - A Historical
Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 499 (1985). "While varying substantially in detail,
mainstream theories of the intent of the drafters of the Equal Protection Clause generally
fall into two classes. In the first class are 'race-focused' theories. The other groups
include what might be called open-ended theories." Id. at 500.
21 See Heyman, supra note 20, at 509.
22 See Maltz, supra note 20, at 500-501.
23 E.g., Heyman, supra note 20, at 546-50.
24
Seeid. at 513.
25 See Maltz, supra note 20, at 499.
26 U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV.

27 See generally Maltz, supra note 20; Heyman, supra note 20.
28 See Maltz, supra note 20, at 503.
29 See id.
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political theory of the social contract. 30 Under this theory, citizens of
a state granted allegiance to a state and relinquished certain rights that
they had in nature, but in exchange the sovereign authority had an
obligation to protect them. 3 1 Historically,
32 only outlaws and slaves
were denied the right of equal protection.
"Protection and allegiance are reciprocal ...[i]t is the duty of

the government to protect; of the subject to obey. 33 The discussion
of allegiance and duty seem particularly salient in a discussion of
Military regulations.3 4 The Clause grants the right to equal protection
under the law. 35 It has been argued that once government chooses to
grant protection, it must grant the protection on an impartial basis,
36
although it is under no obligation to grant that protection initially.
This fails to recognize that in 1866 "equality" was understood to mean
at its most fundamental level, "being fully recognized as a freeman
and a citizen." 37 As the District Court in Able noted, "Voting, taking
public office, serving on juries, and serving in the Military are the
primary acts of public citizenship. In this court's judgment, equal
protection forbids the government to erect barriers to the full
participation of the plaintiffs in this case as American citizens. 38
B. The Levels of Scrutiny
There are three recognized levels of scrutiny: rational basis,
30Id.at 507; see also Heyman, supra note 20, at 563-64.
31See Heyman, supra note 20, at 513-14.
32 See Maltz, supra note 30, at 509.
33 See Heyman, supra note 20, at 546 (quoting Senator Alvin Stewart
of

Nevada during the 39th Congress, 1866).
34 The mission of the Military necessitates "the subordination of the desires
and
interests of the individual to the needs of the service." Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83,
92 (1953). Based on the theory behind the Equal Protection Clause, as payment for this
level of allegiance, the very least the Military can provide its members is a guarantee that
members e ually situated will be treated equally with regard to Military laws.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36 See Heyman, supra note 20, at 563.

Id.
38 See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 864.
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intermediate, and strict. 39 These levels guide the court's analysis of a
Constitutional challenge, not whether the court should analyze the
challenge.4 ° In recent years, there have been indications from the
Supreme Court that there are, in fact, more than the three basic levels
of scrutiny. 41 However, the Supreme Court has not explicitly
acknowledged this expansion.
The first of the three levels, and the most government friendly,
is rational basis review. Generally, under rational basis review, a law
will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.4
This level is applied in all cases where there is no
fundamental right being infringed and where the injured party is not a
member of a "suspect class. 43 The Supreme Court has been loath to
39 The levels are applied to all cases where there is an assertion of an Equal
Protection or Due Process violation. The levels, in effect, tell the court how to evaluate
the claim. What basis of review is applied will depend on several factors; one such factor
is the right that is being asserted. Is it a "fundamental right," i.e., one that is so basic to
our system and way of life that violating it, is a violation of the very fabric of our society,
then strict scrutiny is applied. The level applied by the court will also depend on who the
plaintiff is. For example, a claim of racial or religious discrimination will also trigger
strict scrutiny, partly because these are considered "immutable" characteristics which
have been historically discriminated against, but, also because of the perception of a
certain level of political powerlessness. Gender based claims trigger intermediate
scrutiny. If you are a member of group that is not considered politically powerless, or as
hhving an immutable characteristic, or are asserting a right that is not deemed
fundamental, the court will use rational basis. E.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-4 1.
40 E.g., id. at 440.
41 For example, in United States v. Virginia, Justice Ginsburg
applied an
"exceedingly persuasive" standard in an Equal Protection challenge to gender based
classifications at the Virginia Military Institute. 518 U.S. 515 at 531-34. Gender
classifications had normally called for intermediate scrutiny. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
439-40. Further, it has been noted that in certain cases the court actually applies rational
basis with a bite. See, e.g., Jeffrey Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming
Breakdown of the Levels ofScrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1984).
42See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Cleburne,
473 U.S. at
432.
43 E.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-41; San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28 (1973). There are many criteria applied to determine whether
someone is a member of a "suspect class." The Supreme Court has said that "immutable
characteristics" are important in determining whether someone is a member of a "suspect
class." Thus, issues of race, national origin, gender, and parentage are suspect and,
therefore, require heightened scrutiny. See generally Fullilove v. Kluznick, 448 U.S. 448,
496-97 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). Whether someone is a member of a "suspect
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expand the recognized "suspect" classes.44 A rational basis analysis
based on the Equal Protection Clause requires, first asking whether
the law is drawing unequal distinctions between those who are
similarly situated, and second if the government's reasons for drawing
these distinctions
is rationally related to a legitimate government
45
purpose.
The other two levels, intermediate and strict scrutiny, as their
names imply, call for more stringent analysis. In cases calling for
intermediate scrutiny, a government regulation must be substantially
related to an important government purpose for it to be upheld.
Generally, intermediate scrutiny is applied in cases involving gender
and parentage.4 6 Finally, under strict scrutiny, a law will be upheld
47
only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.
Traditionally, this level has only been applied in cases of race
classifications and national origin what have been termed
"immutable characteristics" - or where a fundamental right is
infringed.4 8 Strict scrutiny has been described as "strict in theory and
fatal in fact" because in most cases where it is applied, the
government regulation is found unconstitutional. 49
In equal protection claims the court relies on the three levels
of scrutiny to determine what method of analysis to apply. 50 The
applicable level is determined by examining the claimed injury and
class" will also be determined by the class' ability to protect itself through the political
process; for example, aliens cannot vote and are thus not able to protect themselves via
voting. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367 (1971). The Court has also
looked to whether the class has a history of discrimination. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S.

at 496.
44 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND
POLICIES 530 (1997).
46

See generally id. at 528.
ld.at 429.

47See, eg., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (using strict scrutiny
to hold a
Texas redistricting plan unconstitutional because the new district lines were drawn with
race as the predominant motivating factor); also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 529.

W8See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 529; e.g.. Cleburne, at 439-41.
49Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search o Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing

Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
50 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 527-3 1.
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the nature of the person injured. 51 In other words, the court reviews
the claim through the eyes of the injured party. Only once it has
determined what level of analysis to apply does it turn to look at the
justification of the injuring party, the government. 52 In evaluating
Equal Protection claims regarding the Military, the court has always
reversed its methodology. 53 Instead of looking to the needs and
claims of the injured party, it looks to the justifications of the entity
doing the injury, the Military.5 4 In that way it has consistently applied
only rational basis review to Military regulations.

C. The Lack of ScrutinyApplied to the Military: Due Deference
These three levels are the norm, but when applied to the
Military, the Supreme Court has consistently set aside these
classifications and only applied the most deferential rational basis
review regardless of the right which is being curtailed.5 5 In Goldman
v. Weinberger, then Justice Rehnquist quoted Rostker v. Goldberg
stating that "judicial deference . . is at its apogee when legislative
action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies
and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged. 5 6
Id. at 528. "[AII equal protection issues can be broken down into three
questions: What is the classification? What level of scrutiny should be applied? Does the
particular government action meet the level of scrutiny?" Id. The first of these questions
is implicitly about the injured party in terms of how is the government treating someone
differently from the way it is treating someone else.

2 Id.
53See infra notes 80-207 and accompanying
text.
54E.g., Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921) (holding that the Military could
curtail the right to trial by jury); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (limiting the

availability of Habeas Corpus and Fourteenth Amendment protections in the Military);
see also cf 28 U.S.C §§ 867, 1259 (citing special -proceedings regarding the right of
appeal and the right to petition for certiorari); Kelly E. Henriksen, Gays, The Military,
and JudicialDeference: When the Courts Must Reclaim Equal Protection as Their Area
of Expertise, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1273 (1996).
E.g., Kahn, 255 U.S. 1; Burns, 346 U.S. 137. See also 28 U.S.C § 867, 1259
(citing special proceedings regarding the right of appeal and the right to petition for
certiorari).
56 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (holding the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the Military, was not a prohibition
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Although the Court has indicated, as Chief Justice Earl Warren stated,
that those who serve in the Military "may not be stripped of their
basic rights," 57 it has been relatively hard-pressed to hold the Military
accountable when it does strip its members of their rights.58
The Court has many justifications for abdicating its "duty...
to say what the law is"' 59 when dealing with the Military. 60 First and
foremost is the separation of powers argument which looks to the
Constitution. 6' The Court has also cited what has been termed the
"majoritarian" argument, which places the Court as second class
citizen to the "duly elected" branches of government. 62 The special
nature of the Military has also been cited as a justification for due
deference.6 3 This special nature includes the need for discipline in the
Military; 64 the Military's traditional mode of operation which
demands that its soldiers subjugate themselves as individuals for the
on enacting on duty uniform regulations, and citing to Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,
70 (1981) which held the Military Selective Service Act did not violate due process, even
though it excluded women, because women were not similarly situated to men).
57Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181,
188
(1962) (discussing Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953)). Then Chief Justice Warren
stated that since the Court in Burns had indicated that "court martial proceedings could be
challenged through habeas corpus actions brought in civil courts, if those proceedings had
denied the defendant fundamental rights" when viewed in their entirety, the various
opinions in Burns stood for "the proposition that our citizens in uniform may not be
stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes." Id. See
also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (stating "this Court has never held,
nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts
for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service.").
58 See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305 (holding enlisted Military personnel were
unable to maintain an action for damages against a superior officer for violation of his
constitutional rights when those rights were violated in course of Military service).
59See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). "It
is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177.
60 See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d 628.
61 See, e.g., Henriksen, supra note 54, 1277-78; Jeffrey S. Davis, Military
Policy Toward Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical,and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L.
REv. 55 (1991).
62 See, e.g., Rostker, 453 U.S. 57 at 65-66 (holding the Selective Service Act
constitutional).
63 See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d at 632; Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
64 See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d 628.
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good of the unit; 65 the need for readiness at a moments notice; 66 and

unit moral.67 Although there is a consensus that some level of
deference is due to the Military, it can be argued that deference does
68

not mean the Military should have free rein.

The separation of powers argument is rooted in Article 1,
section 8 of the Constitution, which states that Congress has the power
"[tio make Rules for the Governing and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces" and "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and

proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers

.

Congress, of course has been given a host of other powers and duties
under the Constitution. 69 Since Marbury v. Madison70 the Court has
been able, and to varying degrees willing, to review Congress'
exercise of those powers. 71 Historically, the only area where the court
65 See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
66 See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d 628.
67 Id.
68 E.g., Warren, supra note 57 at 188. "When the authority of the military has
such a sweeping capacity for affecting the lives of our citizenry, the wisdom of treating
the military establishment as an enclave beyond the reach of the civilian courts almost
inevitably is drawn into question." Id. See also Henriksen, supra note 54.
69 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (Commerce Clause, Tax and Spend,
Naturalization).
70 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
71 For example, during the New Deal era, almost every important piece of
legislation passed under the rubric of the Commerce Clause was overturned. E.g., Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding unconstitutional the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935) (holding the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional). In 1937, for
many reasons - not the least of which was presidential threat, this pattern changed. See
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS (1941) (discussing President Roosevelt's "court packing"

plan); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural
Adjustment Act). For over 50 years after President Roosevelt's re-election in 1936 and
his "court packing plan" in 1937, no Commerce Clause legislation was declared
unconstitutional - until United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding
unconstitutional the Gun Free School Zones Act). See CHEMERISKY, supra note 44 at
194.
The Executive Branch has also not been immune from judicial power. See
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding President Nixon had to produce
tapes of his conversations while in office in order to comply with the terms of a subpoena
issued to him as part of a criminal trial).
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has consistently stepped aside has been the area of Congress' powers
in the realm of the Military.7 2
Similar to the separation of powers argument, the majoritarian
view, which argues that because Congress is duly elected, and the
Court is not, Congress is in a better position to decide what is best for
the people and can answer to the people via the political process.73
However, this argument appears the most skewed when applied to the
decidedly counter majoritarian Military, where the leaders are
appointed, not elected. As such the probability of abuse is potentially
at its zenith.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, discussing the
majoritarian view, argues "The function of a judge is to give concrete
meaning and application to our constitutional values. Once we
perceive this to be the judicial function ...then we are led to wonder
why the performance of this function is conditioned upon legislative
failure in the first place. 74 With regard to gays in the Military, the
long-standing argument has been that our values do not include
homosexuality. 5 But, as discussed earlier, our long standing values
do include the concept of equal protection of the law. 76 Further, as
Professor Chemerinsky argued, if one "defines 'democratic'. . . to
reflect the actual nature of decision making," it can be seen that the
branches of government actually occupy different spaces on the
"continuum" of the democratic process and that all the branches, to
72 See generally Able, 155 F.3d at 632-33 (discussing the long history of due

deference to the Military).
73See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term - Foreword:
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 77-86 (1989).

74Id. at 85 (quoting, Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term - - Foreword: The
Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 9).
75 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). "The
Court's opinion contains grim, disapproving hints that Coloradans have been guilty of
'animus' or 'animosity' toward homosexuality, as though that has been established as unAmerican . . . I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible murder, for example ... and could exhibit even 'animus' toward such conduct. Surely
that is the only sort of 'animus' at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct,
the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we
held constitutional in Bowers [v. Hardwickl . . .Coloradans are, as I say, entitled to be
hostile toward homosexual conduct ....
" Id. at 644 (emphasis supplied).
76 Supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
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77
varying degrees, are accountable to the electoral process.
The Court has cited the special nature of the Military, the need
for discipline, the call for soldiers to subjugate themselves as
individuals, the need for readiness at a moments notice, and the need

for unit moral as reasons for supporting the doctrine of due deference
to the Military. For example, in Orloff v. Willoughby, the Court
reasoned that "the Military constitutes a specialized community

governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly
government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to
interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters. ' T This begs the
question, at what point does the Military's blatant flouting of the

Constitution stop being a "legitimate Army matter" and become a
judicial matter? It is well established that interpreting the Constitution
and securing that the government comports with its principles are
indeed matters for the judiciary.7 9
II. CONFUSED STANDARDS: ABLE V. UNITED STATES

The Second Circuit in Able chose to use as its model for
rational basis review the Heller v. Doe8 0 standard. There "the equal
protection guarantee of the Constitution is satisfied when the
government differentiates between persons for a reason that. bears a
rational relationship to an appropriate governmental interest."8 1 In
77 Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 77-78.
78 See 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (holding unless there is a showing that someone
is being held in the Military unlawfully, the plaintiff can not use a habeas corpus
proceedin19in order for the Court to compel his discharge).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137.
80 509 U.S. 312 (1993). Heller involved a Kentucky statute, which required
clear and convincing evidence for involuntary civil commitments to institutions, based on
mental retardation. This is in contrast to a reasonable doubt standard that is imposed for
involuntary commitment based on mental illness. The Supreme Court held that the
Kentucky statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause under rational basis review
because of the differences between people who were mentally retarded and those who
were mentally ill; as well as because there were differences in the treatment of both types
of persons. Id.
81 See Able, 155 F.3d at 631. It is highly questionable whether discriminating
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contrast, the Second Circuit stated that the protection afforded by the
Equal Protection Clause is "that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike." 82 This is the language from Cleburne83 where the
court used rational basis with teeth. The Court, however, pointed out
that if persons are not similarly situated, the government is free to
treat them differently. 84 The Court made further use of Heller and
stated that the plaintiffs had to negate every conceivable rationale the
government might have for supporting this legislation whether 85
or not
litigation.
of
course
the
in
it
mentioned
ever
had
the government
The standard articulated in Heller is an impossible one to
meet. The burden of proof is made even more difficult by placing it
squarely on the shoulders of the plaintiffs. 86 The Court correctly
noted that "Under the rational basis test, the government 'has no
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory
classification'." 87 Nonetheless, this argument fails to recognize that
the issue is not solely about the rationality of the legislation, but also
includes the legitimacy of the legislation's purpose. As Romer and
Cleburne made amply clear, an illegitimate purpose is not to be
borne.88
A. Those Similarly Situated?
As part of its discussion of rational basis, the Second Circuit
in Able discussed at great length the due deference owed to the
Military.89 The Court detailed the traditional reasons for giving
deference to the Military stating that "[o]ur review of Military
regulations . . . is far more deferential than constitutional review of
against those similarly situated is an appropriate governmental interest.
82 Id.

83 473 U.S. 432 at 439.
84 See Able, 155 F.3d 628 at 631.
85

Id. at 632.
See id.
87 Id. (quoting Heller v. Doe, at 320).
88 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
86

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
89 See Able, 155 F.3d 628.
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similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society." 90 The Court
noted that other rights, which are constitutionally guaranteed in a
civilian setting, are restricted in the Military setting. 9 1 For example,
the right to trial by jury92 is not available in the Military; 93 the right of
appeal is curtailed in the Military setting; and there are special
regulations regarding writs of certiorari. 94
Further, both the
availability of Habeas Corpus and Fourth Amendment protections are
curtailed. 95 Finally, the Court noted that the First Amendment's
privileges have also been curtailed in the Military. 96 The Court

concluded that although they were "not free to disregard the
Constitution
matters.

. . .

we owe great deference to Congress in military

97

This body of cases. makes clear that those in the Military are
not to be afforded the same protections as civilians.

However, the

Second Circuit's use of these cases disregards a well-established
prong of the equal protection test, that is, that the test is to be applied
to those similarly situated.98 In this way, the equal protection of a

homosexual serviceperson is to be judged against that of a
heterosexual serviceperson, not a homosexual civilian. Furthermore,

persons of equal rank in the Military are equally situated, regardless of
their sexual orientation.
The Act, as written, does not prohibit the presence of
90 Id.at 633.
Id. at 632-33.
92 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
93See Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. I, 9 (1920) (holding the specifics of a court
marshal are within the. discretion of the executive branch, and therefore not subject to
judicial review).
94See Able, 155 F.3d at 632 (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 1259 and 10 U.S.C.
§ 867).
95 See id. at 633 (citing to Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 138-42 (1953);
United States v. Stuckey, 10 M.J. 347 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. Middleton, 10
M.J. 123, 126-27 (C.M.A.1981)).
96 See id. at 633-34 (citing to Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) and Greer
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).(freedom of the press); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437, 462 (1971); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509 (1986) (Free Exercise
Clause)).
Id. at 634.
98
Id.at 631.
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homosexual servicepersons, only homosexual conduct.99 Homosexual
conduct is defined to include physical contact a "reasonable person
would understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in
an act ...[either] actively undertaken or passively permitted, between
members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual
desires."100 The Eastern District of New York, in a decision authored
by Senior District Judge Eugene Nickerson, pointed out that there are
many forms of sexual conduct that are proscribed in the Military,
proscriptions which apply equally to all service persons, regardless of
sexual orientation.101 Among these are sodomy, which is defined 10to2
mean both anal and oral sex, i.e., sodomy, fellatio, and cunnilingus.
Furthermore, under Military law, rape is punishable by death,
regardless of the sex of the parties involved. 10 3 Conduct unbecoming
an officer, midshipmen, or cadet is punishable.'0 4 Such conduct has

been interpreted to include sexual misconduct, adultery, and
fraternization. 05 Also, sexual harassment is punishable in the
99See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1998).

See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (f(3) (1998).

Se1 0US.§65(()(19.
101 See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 855-56 (E.D. N.Y.
1997).
102 See Article 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (a)

(1998) (stating that it is punishable for any person to engage in sodomy, which is defined
as "unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same [sex] or opposite sex or
with an animal."). In United States v. Hall, 34 M.J. 695 (A.C.M.R. 1991), United States
v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174 (C.M.A. 1994) and United States v. Gates, 40 M.J. 354, 355
(C.M.A. 1994), it became established that "sodomy" included not only anal sex, but
fellatio and cunnilingus as well.
103 See Art. 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1998)
(providing that any person who forces someone, without their consent to have sex "is
guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial
may direct.").
104 See Art. 133, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1998).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Czekala, 38 M.J. 566 (A.C.M.R. 1993); United
States v. Boyett 37 M.J. 872 (A.C.M.R. 1993). Fraternization is defined as "personal or
intimate relationships 'that contravene the customary bounds of acceptable seniorsubordinate relationships' and 'improper relationships and social interaction between
officer members as well as enlisted members'." See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 856 (quoting
Department of the Navy, OPNAV Instruction No. 5370.2A § 4(b) (Mar. 14, 1994). This
conduct is equally proscribed to homosexual service persons under § 4(c) of same
regulation and further by the Marine Corps Manual 1100.4. Id.
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10 6

Military.
As the district court pointed out, there are a very large number
of existing regulations governing interpersonal contact in the Military.
All of these regulations apply equally to all service persons, regardless
of gender or sexual orientation.' 0 7 Therefore, the only conduct that is
not covered by the existing regulations, which one could then presume
is the conduct that is to be covered by the Act, is kissing or handholding, off base, with a person not in the Military.10 8 The District
Court found itself at a loss as to how handholding endangered the
mission of the armed forces. 0 9 If the District Court was correct in its
analysis, the Act is not regulating conduct, but status amongst those
equally situated. This sort of "classification of persons undertaken for
its own sake, [is] something the Equal Protection Clause does not
0
permit."''
The equal protection sought by plaintiffs is not that of
homosexual civilians, but that of heterosexual service persons. In the
long line of cases cited by the Second Circuit as justification for its
holding, it failed to take this into consideration."' In particular, the
First Amendment cases, all relied on civilian standards as their
yardstick of rights." 2 However, the yardstick in this case should not
be a civilian standard, but a Military one. Thus, a homosexual
serviceperson should be afforded the same protection of sexual
orientation that a heterosexual service person is granted.

106

See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 856 (citing, e.g., Article 93, U.S. Naval
Regulation, 1990, Article 1 166 (amended Jan. 1993); Marine Corps Order No. 5300.1OA
(July 17, 1989)).
107 Id. at 855-56.
108 See id. at 857.
109 See id.
''0See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
I E.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
112 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 515 (1986).

"Our cases

have acknowledged that in order to protect our treasured liberties, the military must be
able to command service members to sacrifice a great many of the individual freedoms
they enjoyed in the civilian community and to endure certain limitations on the freedoms
they retain." Id.
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B. Rationally Related to a Legitimate Government Purpose?
In Able," 3 the United States Government argued that it was
justified in enacting the "don't ask, don't tell" policy because it
"promotes unit cohesion, enhances privacy and reduces sexual
tension."' 14 The Government further argued that the District Court
failed to grant Congress and the Military the appropriate deference in
deciding eligibility requirements for Military service "and that, under
the correct standard, § 654 is constitutional." ' 5 Plaintiffs argued that
under Romer, Cleburne, and Palmore the policy is motivated by an
illegitimate purpose and therefore can not stand.' 1 6 They further
argued that the purpose of the Act is not rationally related to its
ends. 1 7 In a formalistic analysis, the Second Circuit concluded that
plaintiffs reliance on Cleburne, Romer, and Palmore was misplaced
because those cases did not use traditional rational
basis review and
8
because they did not deal with the Military."
1.City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center
In Cleburne," 9 a corporation was denied a permit for the
operation of a group home for the mentally retarded because of a city
zoning ordinance; they challenged the action in Federal District Court
claiming the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause. 20 The
ordinance required a special permit for the operation of a group home
for the mentally retarded.' 2' The District Court had found that the
City's permit requirements were based on fears about "the negative
attitude of the majority of property owners[,]" and its location - first,
113 155 F.3d 628.
114Id.at 634.
115Id.at 630.
116

See Able, 155 F.3d at 634.

117Id
118 Id.

119 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
121

Id at 435.
Id. at 436.
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across the street from a high school, which might engender taunting
from the students, and second, on a flood plane, which might
endanger the residents of the group home. 122 The District Court held
23
the ordinance constitutional.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied intermediate
scrutiny 124 and affirmed in part and reversed in part.' 25 The Fifth
Circuit held that mental retardation was relevant to many legislative
actions, as such strict scrutiny was not appropriate. 126 However, in
light of the history of "unfair and often grotesque mistreatment" of the
retarded, discrimination against them was "likely to reflect deepseated prejudice."' 27 Further, the mentally retarded lacked political
power and their condition was immutable.' 28 Therefore, the mentally
retarded were a quasi-suspect class and intermediate scrutiny was
applicable.' 29 Under that standard of review, the ordinance was held
unconstitutional because it0 did not "substantially further any important
13
governmental interests."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in part and
vacated in part,' 3' holding that mental retardation was not a quasisuspect class that called for a more heightened standard of review than
normal. 32 The Court stated that because of the inherent nature of
mental retardation, the state interest "in dealing with and providing
122 See id. at 448-49.
123 Id. at 437. The District Court used rational basis review because "no
fundamental right was implicated and [because] mental retardation was neither a suspect
nor quasi-suspect
classification ....Id.
12 4
726 F.2d 191, 198 (1984).

125 Id. at 203. The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court with respect to the

ordinance's constitutionality. Id. at 202. However, the Court held that the Cleburne
Living Center - who had brought the suit on behalf of itself and its potential residents had failed to show an injury to its interests or those of its unidentified, potential members
and therefore lacked standing. Id. at 202-03.
126 Id. at
198.

127 Id. at 197-98.

128 Id. at 198.
129726 F.2d 191, 198 (1984).
130 Id. at 200.
131See 473 U.S. 432 (1985).

132 Id. at 442.
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for them is plainly a legitimate one."' 133 The Court added that "The
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted
goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.
Furthermore, some objectives - such as 'a bare ... desire to harm134
a
politically unpopular group,' - are not legitimate state interests.
The Court further went on to hold that there was no evidence which
showed a rational basis for believing that a group "home ...posed
any special threat to the city's legitimate interests . . .35 Therefore, it
held the ordinance unconstitutional according to the standards of
rational basis review.
2. Palmore v. Sidoti
In Palmore,136 petitioner and respondent - both White
lived, married, and were divorced in Florida.
Petitioner, "the
mother[,] was awarded custody of their 3-year-old daughter." 137 The
next year, respondent filed a petition for custody of their daughter,
seeking to modify the prior custody judgment because of changed
circumstances, namely, because petitioner was living with a Black
man who she later married.13 8 The Florida Trial Court, holding that
the child's best interest would be served by the parental qualifications
of the father, awarded him custody. 139 The Court reasoned that
although respondent's racial animosity towards petitioner's choice in
partners was "not sufficient to wrest custody from the mother[,]"
140
growing up in a racially mixed household would damage the child.
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed. 141
133 Id. at 442.

134 Id. at 446-47.
135

Id. at 448.

136 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
137Id.at 430.
138 Id.
139Id.at 431.
140 Id.
141

See 426 So. 2d 34 (1982).

As the Supreme Court points out, the Florida

District Court "affirmed without opinion." Palmore,466 U.S. at 43 1.
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However, the United States Supreme Court held that the
effects of racial prejudice could not justify a "racial classification
removing an infant child from . .. its mother .. 142 The Court
stated:
The question, however, is whether the reality of
private biases and the possible injury they might inflict
are permissible considerations for removal of an infant
child from the custody of its natural mother. We have
little difficulty concluding that they are not. The
Constitution cannot control such prejudice, but neither
can it tolerate it. Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect. 'Public officials sworn to
uphold the Constitution may not avoid a constitutional
duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private
racial prejudice that they assume to be both widely and
deeply held." 43
3. Romer v. Evans
At issue in Romer 144 was a Colorado state constitutional
amendment - adopted by state referendum - precluding the state or
any of its agencies from enacting, adopting, or enforcing any statute,
regulation, ordinance, or policy which granted homosexuals any sort
of minority status, quota preferences, protected status, or allowed for
any claim of discrimination against them. 45 Plaintiff's brought suit to
enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance and to have it declared
invalid. 46 The District Court "granted a preliminary injunction to stay
enforcement of the amendment" which the Supreme Court of

466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984).
143Id. (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260-261 (1971) (White, J.,
142

dissenting)).
144 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

145 Id.at 623-24.
146 Id. at 625.
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Colorado sustained. 147

The Supreme Court also stated that the

amendment's objective was to repeal existing statutes, regulations,
ordinances, and policies which prohibited discrimination based on
sexual orientation, as well as having the long term effect of
prohibiting any Colorado governmental entity from adopting similar
protective measures in the future. 4 As such the amendment was
subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution because it infringed on the fundamental
rights of homosexuals to participate in the democratic process.' 49 This
right to participate in the democratic process was and is not a
recognized fundamental right. 5 ° On remand, the District reasoned
that the amendment "was not necessary to support any compelling
state interest" and even had it been, "it was not narrowly tailored to
meet that interest" it therefore permanently enjoined the State from
enforcing the amendment. 5 '
The Supreme Court of Colorado
subsequently affirmed this decision.'5 2
The United States Supreme Court also affirmed the decision,
but not for the reasons proffered by the Colorado Supreme Court.' 53
The Court held that the Colorado amendment was invalid because it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and that the amendment served to isolate homosexuals in both "the
private and governmental spheres."' 154 However, the Court refused to
apply strict scrutiny. 55 The Court further held that the amendment

147

Id.

148 See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, at 1284-85 (Sup. Ct. Colo. 1993).
149 See id. at 1285.
150 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 650 n.3 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

"[The Colorado]

Amendment ...does not deny the fundamental right to vote, and the Court rejects the
Colorado court's view that there exists a fundamental right to participate in the political
process." Id.
151 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1340-41 (Sup. Ct.
Colo. 1994).
152 See id. at 1350.
153 Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
154 See id. at 628, 635-36.
155 See id. at 631-32.
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removed "specific" legal protection from homosexuals. 56 These legal
protections included the right to redress from injuries caused by
discrimination and it further served to make reinstatement of these
laws a near impossibility.' 57
The Court reasoned that even if
homosexuals could find redress in anti-discrimination laws of general
applicability, the Colorado amendment's strictures on specific legal
protections imposed special disabilities only on homosexuals. 158 Last,
the Court held that the amendment did59not bear a rational relationship
to a legitimate governmental purpose.'
The State of Colorado had stated as its reasons for enacting
the amendment that the amendment did not discriminate, it only put
homosexuals on the same level as heterosexuals, by removing special
protection, 16 respect for citizens' freedom of association, and
conserving its limited resources to battle discrimination against other
groups.' 6' The U.S. Supreme Court stated that the amendment
imposed "a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group"'' 62 and that it identified "persons by a single trait."' 163 The state
gave as its primary rationale "respect for other citizens' freedom of
association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers
who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality."' 164 As
the Court emphatically stated, "It is a status-based enactment divorced
from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship
to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken
for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not
'16
perm it. 1

156Id.at 629-30.
157Id

158 Id. at 630-3 1.

Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 635.
ld. at 626.
161 Romer,882 P.2d 1335, 1340-41; Romer,517 U.S. 620, 635.
162 Romer,517 U.S. 620, 632.
159See

163
164

Id.at 633.
See id.

165 See id.
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4. The Applicability of These Cases to Able
The Second Circuit in Able stated that these cases were not
applicable for several reasons.
First, Cleburne differed from
traditional rational basis, in that it "forced the government to justify its
discrimination."' 166 This reasoning overlooks the similarities in the
two cases. Just as in Cleburne where the Court noted that the state's
interest is a legitimate one,' 67 in Able there is no dispute that the
Military has a legitimate interest in regulating conduct. However, as
the Court went on to say in Cleburne, "The State may not rely on a
classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as
to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational and further, objectives
-

such as 'a bare ...desire to harm a politically unpopular group,'-

are not legitimate state interests."' 68 Members of the highest levels of
the Military have publicly stated that homosexual service persons now
serve and have always served in the Military with honor. 169 If this is
the case, the Military's response to their legitimate interest is hugely
attenuated. Also, as previously discussed, there are a battalion of
Military regulations which govern conduct and which are generally
applicable. 170 Again, since this is the case, the Military's response to
homosexual service persons then becomes arbitrary and irrational.
Viewed in this light the only reason left for the regulation is a desire
to harm, in this case, a group which is unpopular with the rank and file
of the Military.
The court further stated that Romer, Cleburne, and Palmore
did not occur in the Military setting "where constitutionally mandated
deference to Military assessments and judgments gives the judiciary
far less scope to scrutinize the reasons, legitimate on their face, that
the Military has advanced to justify its actions."' 17 1 There is also a
166 See Able, 155 F.3d at 634.
167 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.

168 Id. at 446-47.
169 Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 855 (citing to testimony of General
Norman Schwarzkopf, S. Hr. No. 103-845, Ex. JX-1, vol. 2, at 612 and General Colin
Powell, 1993 Defense Budget House Hearing, 102d Cong., at 45 (1993)).
170 Supra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
171 Able, 155 F.3d at 634.
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constitutionally mandated power which States have.' 72 Romer in
particular, involved an act that was put in place by popular vote, yet
that was overcome. 173 The Military had stated that it is justified in
keeping open homosexuals out of the Military because the presence of
an open homosexual in a small unit disrupts "unit cohesion[;]" causes
"sexual tension[;]" and that exclusion of open homosexuals "promotes
personal privacy.' 7 4 As the District Court noted, "unity in a fighting
group is an important government interest 175 . . . [b]ut that fact does
not end the court's inquiry. The court must still consider whether the
Act seeks to further that interest in a legitimate way.'' 176 In their PostTrial Brief to the District Court, the state argued that the presence of
an open homosexual in a small unit would cause concern in nonhomosexual service persons because of their "moral precepts and
ethical values."' 177 In their respective testimonies before Congress on
the policy, Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell stated that homosexuals
had, and continue to serve in good standing and as good Americans in
the Military, but that the presence of open homosexuality caused "the
negative reaction of service members who disapprove of
homosexual[s].', 178 As the Supreme Court in Cleburne clearly stated,
the bolstering of personal prejudices is an illegitimate governmental
79
purpose, regardless of the legitimacy of the original interest.
In addition, the rationales given by the city in Cleburne, by the
father in Palmore and by the state in Romer are surprisingly similar to
the rationale given by the Military for the Act. In Cleburne the
Supreme Court accepted the District Courts holding regarding the

172 U.S. CONST. art. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. X; U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
173517 U.S. 620.

174 Able, 155 F.3d at 634.
175 Able, 968 F. Supp. at 858 (citing to testimony of Generals H. Norman
Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell., S. Rep. No. 103-112, Ex. JX-15, at 274, 275).
176Id
177Id.(citing to Plaintiffs (then Defendant's) Post-Trial Brief, at 10).
178 Id. at 859 (citing to Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir.
1997)

(Fletcher, J., dissenting) upholding the "don't ask, don't tell" policy).
179 See 473 U.S. 432. The Court acknowledged the state's legitimate interest in
the mentally retarded, yet held the ordinance unconstitutional. Id.
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city's rationale.' 8 0 The city claimed it was concerned about the
attitude of the neighborhood residents and the safety of the group
home residents. 18 1 In Palmore there was concern over the child's
emotional well being. 182 Finally, in Romer the State of Colorado cited
respect for heterosexual citizen's freedom of association. 183 The
Military has cited unit morale.
It has cited the inability of
heterosexual service persons to accept homosexuals. The Military has
pointed to its inability to protect homosexual service persons from the
bias of heterosexuals. The Court in Cleburne, Palmore, and Romer
found similar justifications insufficient as a constitutional matter.
Similarly, the justifications the Military gives for the Act should be
found insufficient as a constitutional matter.
The District Court points out that the arguments regarding
sexual tension and privacy interests may be valid points for a policy
which excludes homosexuals from serving altogether 184 but that is not
the policy Congress adopted.18 5 The government has offered no
reasons why an openly homosexual service person in good standing
would be more likely to make an untoward advance than an openly
heterosexual service member to another of the opposite sex. 186 This is
particularly true in light of the existing regulations governing
conduct.'8 7 As the District Court further pointed out, since the policy
does not exclude homosexuals from serving, it can be inferred that
there are homosexuals serving in the Military. In light of this, the
policy tends to breed suspicion and tension rather than dissipate it,
because those with homophobic tendencies would then be constantly
looking over their shoulders lest anyone might be looking at them in

180 Id. at 448-49.
181
182 Id.
182466 U.S. 429.
183 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.

184 See 968 F. Supp. 850, 854.
185 See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (generally stating that the act targets conduct and not
status).

186 See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 855, 857.
187 See supra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
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an objectionable way.' 88
The Circuit Court went on to state that Romer, Cleburne and
Palmore were not applicable because they involved restrictions based
on status not conduct, 189 and that as it had previously held and as the
government maintains, the "don't ask, don't tell" policy prohibits
conduct, not status.1 90 Exactly what kind of conduct it seeks to curtail
is questionable. There is a Military regulation governing sodomy, 19'
which as previously noted, 92 is applicable to all service personnel
93
equally. Further, there are regulations governing fraternization,
regulations governing conduct unbecoming an officer, 94 in short,
practically all interpersonal conduct is regulated in the Military. In
light of this, the District Court concluded that the only conduct left to
regulate, and thus the only conduct which the policy could possibly be
regulating would be hand holding or kissing, while off duty, with a
person not in the Military. 95 It is difficult to imagine how this
conduct impairs the Military mission. What would be a more
plausible explanation is that the policy is a thinly veiled regulation of
status and not of conduct, as the government maintains.
Last, plaintiffs argued that the ends of the "don't ask, don't
188 See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 859. It is sad to note that Judge Nickerson's
prediction has, in some respects, come true. See Philip Shenon, Revised Military
Guidelines Fail to Quell Gay Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at A6. In 1998, the
Military discharged 1,145 people for homosexuality. In 1994, the year the policy was
enacted, there were 617 people discharged for homosexuality. Id. In addition, incidents
of violence aimed at suspected homosexual service persons are on the rise. For example,
in July 1999 Pfc. Barry Winchell died after he "was ...beaten with a baseball bat by a
member of his unit after his homosexuality became known on the base" in Kentucky. Id.
There have been incidents reported where persons complained to their commanding
officer of being harassed, and subsequently found themselves under investigation. See
Philip Shenon, Pentagon Moving to End Abuses of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at Al. As a result, the Pentagon has enacted new guidelines for
handling accusations brought under the auspices of the policy. Id.
189SeeAble, 155 F.3d at, 635.
190 Id.(citing to Able, 88 F. 3d at 1297-99).
191 See Art. 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925(a) (1998).
192 Supra note 102 and accompanying text.
193 See Art. 133, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1998).
194 See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 856.

195 See id. at 857.
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tell" policy "are not rationally related to [its] prohibition[s] . . . on
conduct.196 The Circuit Court concluded that they were not at liberty
to question the judgment of Congress or its findings. 9 7 In short, they
would not substitute their "judgment for that of Congress.' 19 8
However, as the District Court stated:
For the United States government to require those selfidentifying as homosexuals to hide their orientation
and to pretend to be heterosexuals is to ask them to
accept a judgment that their orientation is in itself
disgraceful and they are unfit to serve. To impose
such a degrading and deplorable condition for
remaining in the Armed Services cannot in fairness be
justified on the ground that the truth might arouse the
prejudice of some of their fellow members.
The plaintiffs are American citizens. They wish to
serve their country in positions of responsibility and
potential danger. This country includes people of
many different kinds and beliefs. But as Chief Justice
Marshall said in a different context, 'we are one
people.' Americans are one people both in war and in
peace. It is not within our constitutional tradition for
designate members of one societal
our government to
199
pariahs.
as
group
While it is true that the judiciary is not "duly elected" and that
the Constitution has mandated a government of enumerated powers,2 °°
it is equally true that the judiciary is part of our system of checks and
balances. The courts have a duty equal to that of the elected branches
of government in upholding the Constitution, and because they are
somewhat insulated from the whims of the masses, 20 1 they have a
196 Able, 155 F.3d at 634.
197 Id. at 635-36.
198 Id. at 636.
199

968 F. Supp. at 861 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 412).

200 See U.S. CONST. arts. 1-111.
201 See U.S. CONST. art. 111, § I ("The judges, both of the supreme and inferior
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unique ability to do just that, particularly when other branches fall
prey to mob rule. In light of Able,2 °2 it would appear that had
President Harry Truman not eliminated racial discrimination in the
armed forces, 203 the Military might still be segregated - if Congress
had a few legislative findings to back up its position, and if Military
leaders felt that integration would injure moral - regardless of the
civil rights cases heard by the Court in the 1950's and 60's.204 "[l]t is
essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United
States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment
and opportunity for all those who serve in our country's defense. 2 °5
Our Constitution dictates equal protection of the law. 206 The Court
has held that this is true for those equally situated.20 7 Homosexual
service members are equally situated to heterosexual service
members. As such, any military regulation, regardless of the
legislative findings, which differentiates based solely on sexual
orientation can not stand as Constitutional.
III. HOMOSEXUALS AS SUSPECT OR QUASI-SUSPECT CLASS

It is anyone's guess whether classifying homosexuals as a
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good behavior ... ")
202 It is important to note that the other circuits who have heard cases regarding
the "don't ask, don't tell" policy have all held the act constitutional. But, as the District
Court pointed out, those are distinguishable from the case at hand. See 968 F. Supp. 850
at 865. For example, in Phillips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997), plaintiff, a man,
had announced that he engaged in and would continue to engage in sexual relations with
men. This is a violation of Article 125 of the Military Code which makes it a crime to
engage in sodomy. Furthermore, in both Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996), and Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir.
1996) cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997), the courts only addressed the limitations on
speech contained in § 654(b)(2) and held just as the Second Circuit held, Able v. United
States, 88 F.3d 1280 (1996), that if§ 654(b)(1) - the section at issue in this note - was
Constitutional, then so were the prohibitions on speech. See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 865.
203 See Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. Supp. 1947, at 722 (1948).
204 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Ed., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
205 President Harry S. Truman, Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. Supp. 1947, at
722 (July 29, 1948) (ending racial segregation in the armed forces).
206 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
207 Able, 155 F.3d at 631.
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suspect or quasi-suspect class would have engendered a different
response from the Second Circuit. After all, the Court has upheld
other Military legislation that impinges on Constitutional
protections. 20 8 But, as the Eastern District of New York in Able noted,
homosexuals have a "bleak history" of discrimination, both "in this
country and elsewhere." 20 9 "Because of the immediate and severe
opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals or one so identified
publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue
their rights openly in the public arena."2 10 This is highlighted by the
fact that there are currently only three openly gay members of
Congress, 2 1 and in the uproar over the nomination of the openly gay
212
James Hormel to the position of Ambassador to Luxembourg.
When Senator Dick Armey (R-TX) can refer to Senator Barney Frank
(D-MA) as "Barney fag" in the halls of Congress, the Court should
recognize that with political power or not, there is an ingrained level
of bias that our law can not continue to sanction.213
In addition, simply because there is dispute as to whether
homosexuality is an immutable trait does not put an end to the
question of suspect classification. For example, alienage, which has
traditionally been thought worthy of heightened scrutiny, is not
immutable in light of naturalization laws. Further, religion, another
classification deemed worthy of heightened scrutiny, is not immutable
in this age of born-again Christians and religious conversion. Today,
even gender can be changed. As such, the bright line distinction of
immutability fades. The Court should at the very least begin to
208 See supra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
209 968 F. Supp. 850, 862.
210 Id. at 863 (quoting Justice Brennan's dissent from denial of writ of certiorari
in Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014)
211 E.g. Hanna Rosin, Newly Elected Gay Congresswoman Is Taking Historic
Role in Stride, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1998, at A12 (listing Barney Frank, Jim Kolbe, and
Tammy Baldwin as openly gay persons in Congress).
212 See Derrick Z. Jackson, Clinton Tests Lott on Gay Ambassador, BOST.

GLOBE, Jan. 15, 1999, at A19 (discussing Senator Trent Lott's open opposition to Mr.
Hormel's nomination).
213 See Hate Speech Comes to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at § 4, p.

436

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVI

reconsider the wisdom of its current three tiered approach to equal
protection analyses. While the Court's caution regarding expanding
the suspect classes is arguably prudent, to deny access to a group of
persons who fit the established criteria makes one question the Court's

reasons for the denial. These questions go beyond the issue of sexual
orientation and whether as an individual one finds homosexuality
morally reprehensible.

IV. CONCLUSION

While it is arguable whether homosexuals should indeed be
classified as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and thus afforded
heightened scrutiny, it seems clear that the "don't ask, don't tell"
policy does indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause. The only real
214
question remaining is whether the courts will do anything about it.
214 On September 29, 1999 the European Court of Human Rights decided two
cases in which they found the United Kingdom's (U.K.) ban on homosexuals in the
military violated articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. See
Press Release Issued by the Registrar, Judgments in the Cases of Lustig-Prean& Beckett
v. the United Kingdom and Smith & Grady v. the United Kingdom, European Court of
Human Rights, Sept. 27, 1999 (visited Oct. 2, 1999) <http://www.dhcour.coe.
fr/eng/PRESS/New%20Court/Lustig-Prean%20epresse.htm>.
Article 8 of the
Convention provides for respect as to private and family lives and Article 14 deals with
discrimination. See id. at 2, 3. In order to uphold the regulation, the U.K. needed to
present "convincing and weighty reasons." Id. at 2. The U.K. cited reasons that by now
should sound familiar, "the ...core argument was that the presence of homosexuals in
the armed forces would have a substantial and negative effect on morale and
consequently, on the fighting power and operational effectiveness of the armed forces."
Id.Just as with the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, the U.K. did not base its objections on
homosexual's inability to be good soldiers. Id. The Court noted its recognition "that
certain difficulties could be anticipated with a change in policy (as was the case with the
presence of women and racial minorities in the past) ... any such difficulties were
essentially conduct-based and could be addressed by a strict code of conduct and
disciplinary rules." Id.
The New York Times recently reported that on January 12th, in response to the
decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the government of Great Britain
announced the end of their long standing ban on openly gay homosexuals serving in the
armed forces. Sarah Lyall, British Under European ruling, End Ban on Openly Gay
Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, at Al. As the article noted "The change brings
Britain into line with almost all other NATO nations, including France, Canada, and
Germany." Id. Almost all, that is, except the United States. It is interesting to note that
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It is telling to note that the government has not maintained that the
policy does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, only that under an
deferential standard the courts should not question the
extremely
2 15
statute.
Romer, Cleburne, and Palmore left us without any real
standards to apply, or at least no test per se as to when the Courts,
while applying a rational basis standard, should inquire further into
the governments proffered reasons for enacting the legislation. One
thing is clear from these cases, an illegitimate end can never justify a
legitimate means. One can begin to draw parallels between these
three cases. For example, in both Cleburne and Romer there was
discussion that analogized plaintiffs' positions to the traditional basis
for suspect and quasi-suspect classification. Further, although, in
these cases the Court was loath to expand the classes, there were
many similarities between the plaintiffs' positions and those of
plaintiffs that have traditionally been placed in the suspect and quasisuspect classes. As such, it is now up to the courts to begin to clarify
a standard. The Second Circuit missed an opportunity not only to do
the right thing with regard to the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, but to
try to forge some order out of chaos. Ultimately, the Second Circuit
missed an opportunity to walk through the door opened by the
Supreme Court in Romer, Cleburne and Palmore. By failing to apply
these cases and continuing to give the Military an inordinately high
level of deference, the court has not only failed to clarify when and
where it is appropriate to apply the basis of review used in Romer,
Cleburne, and Palmore, but it also has failed to afford our gay service
persons the equal protection of the law guaranteed to them by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Celena R. Mayo
Great Britain is lifting the ban by putting in place a series of regulations which, much like
the existing U.S. regulations - exclusive of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy - govern
"all manner of social and sexual relations, whether heterosexual or homosexual." Id.
And includes "sexual harassment; overt displays of affection . . .; and taking sexual
advantage of subordinates." Id.
215 See Able, 155 F.3d at 631. The government merely contended that given
sufficient deference to congressional findings, the Act is constitutional. Id.

